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Abstract
In this article we examine elite formation in relation to money power within the city
of London. Our primary aim is to consider the impact of the massive concentration
of such power upon the city’s political life, municipal and shared resources and social
equity. We argue that objectives of city success have come to be identified and
aligned with the presence of wealth elites while wider goals, of access to essential
resources for citizens, have withered. A diverse national and global wealth-elite is
drawn to a city with an almost unique cultural infrastructure, fiscal regime and
ushering butler class of politicians. We consider how London is being made for
money and the monied – in physical, political and cultural terms. We conclude
that the conceptualization of elites as wealth and social power formations operating
within urban spatial arenas is important for capturing the nature of new social div-
isions and changes.
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The Capital after Capital
In this article we develop an interest in extreme wealth in relation to new
and existing work on both elite formation and urban studies as a spur to
thinking through the impact of global wealth-elites on the dynamics of
political and social life in the city of London. Piketty’s (2014) Capital in
the Twenty-First Century raises many important issues for the critical
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social sciences (Savage, 2014a). His analysis of the contemporary re-
emergence of the ‘u¨ber-wealthy’ has been crucial in shifting debates
away from abstract distributional concerns relating to income and
wealth towards a realization that a better understanding of the ‘tiny,
stratospheric apex that owns most of the world’ (Hay and Muller,
2012: 75)1 is a necessary prerequisite for something approaching an ade-
quate social science (Sayer, 2014). However, Piketty’s analysis might be
further developed by thinking-through the kind of geography of capital
or elite formation that follows from his analysis (Jones, 2014; Savage,
2014a; Webber and Burrows, 2015). In particular, we suggest that ﬁnan-
cialization and globalization, while important in terms of explaining
London’s particular attraction to global wealth-elites, need to be com-
bined with analyses of other political and socio-cultural factors in order
to distinguish London’s reconﬁguration as the pre-eminent plutocratic
city of recent decades.
There are a number of diﬀerent ways of measuring the number of
‘u¨ber-wealthy’ individuals across the globe, but arguably the most inﬂu-
ential of these are the annual World Wealth Reports produced by
Capgemini and RBC Wealth Management for the ﬁnancial services
sector. The most recent of these (2016) calculates that there were some
15.4 million of what they term High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) –
each with $1 million or more of investable assets – distributed around the
globe (although in a far from random pattern) in 2015. By way of com-
parison the same source estimates that the global population of HNWIs
in 2008, at the time of the global ﬁnancial crisis, was just 8.6 million. This
global population is heavily urbanized and concentrated in the command
centres of the global economy (Hay, 2013; Hay and Beaverstock, 2016;
Koh et al., 2016) and in those cities facilitating investments into real
estate and ﬁnancial products as well as signiﬁcant ﬂows of illicit capital
(Platt, 2015). It should come as no surprise then that, of this group,
some 553,000 reside in the UK, with the great bulk of them – about
0.5 million – living in London and its environs (Burrows et al., 2016;
Cunningham and Savage, 2015; Savage et al., 2015).2 The annual ‘rich-
lists’ produced by The Sunday Times are also helpful in identifying the
individuals and families who possess huge amounts of wealth. The most
recent of these (Sunday Times Magazine, 2017) reveals that, as of 2016,
there were 86 individuals with wealth of more than £1 billion resident in
London, compared to New York with 74, San Francisco with 60, Hong
Kong with 59 and Moscow with 58.
How best to conceptualize this ‘stratospheric apex’ of the ‘1 per cent’
(Dorling, 2014) is a source of much debate. For some we have entered a
‘second gilded age’ (Freeland, 2012: 1–6) – a new era of what Piketty terms
‘patrimonial capitalism’. This suggests the need for a reinvigorated ana-
lysis of elites (Aguiar and Schneider, 2012; Birtchnell and Caletrio, 2013;
Fernandez et al., 2016; Savage andWilliams, 2008), and the ‘super-rich’ in
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particular (Beaverstock et al., 2004; Featherstone, 2013, 2014; Forrest
et al., 2017; Hay, 2013; Hay and Beaverstock, 2016; Koh et al., 2016),
who, in more popular parlance, are variously labelled as a ‘superclass’ of
‘plutocrats’ imagined as residing in a global ‘Richistan’ (Frank, 2007;
Freeland, 2012; Rothkopf, 2008). For us it has been a reimagining of
this concept of a ‘plutocracy’ – the presence and inﬂuence of ‘money as
power’ in the political realm – that oﬀers most analytic purchase on our
primary concern here: to better understand the impact of the global ‘u¨ber-
wealthy’ on the local social, economic and political geography of London.
Hitherto the notion of a plutocracy has tended to be considered in
terms of the mechanisms by which wealth attempts to purchase a com-
pliant political class (Green, 2012). In this article we want to examine
how this phenomenon might manifest itself in the urban sphere. We
attempt to adapt the idea to help develop the concept of what we term
a ‘plutocratic city’. The core of our argument is a simple one: if, by the
late 1990s, London had become a city of the ‘middle-classes’ (Butler with
Robson, 2003), now it is a space increasingly made by, and in response
to, the raw power of supremely monied individuals; individuals whose
profound wealth is both courted and supported by a large cadre of cul-
tural, ﬁnancial and political intermediaries (Beaverstock et al., 2004; Hay
and Muller, 2012).3 Such a city could, of course, be identiﬁed and under-
stood quite narrowly via the connections between the wealthy and pol-
itical elites but, as we argue here, the changes extend to a wider set of
domains and are felt increasingly deeply. These domains include changes
within key elements of the physical, cultural, economic and social land-
scape of the city that has been constructed for a wealth-elite upon whose
coat-tails hang a raft of intermediaries (Burrows et al., 2017; York, 2015).
In recent years London’s skyline, ambiance and economy have
changed in increasingly evident ways, indexing the emergence of what
might be termed a plutocratic city – a city that expresses in stark terms
the raw money-power of its new and existing elites. A range of indicators
can be invoked to help mark the presence of these changes and the rise of
a conjunction of factors that highlight that the city not only works for
global capital in the abstract but also for its embodied form – the
expanding groups of the super-wealthy who invest, circulate and con-
tract-out the re-sculpting of the very fabric of the metropolis in order to
smooth the way for their bodies, social lives and investable assets. While
classical Marxist analysis suggested that the money power of the bour-
geoisie bought control of the means of production and of political power
(Harvey, 2010), such power has hitherto tended to be overlooked within
studies of elites (Savage and Williams, 2008; Davies and Williams, 2017).
Such power, often mediated through compliant city governance elites
(Freeland, 2012), has enabled the mass construction of bunker residences
and super high-rise towers (Atkinson, 2006; Graham, 2016), seamless
and sealed mobility systems (Atkinson, 2015), and a burgeoning
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infrastructure of personal ﬁnancial facilities, personal services and luxury
outlets (Beaverstock and Faulconbridge, 2013). These are dramatic shifts
which express a more enhanced and deepened accommodation of wealth
than hitherto; of a city more fully animated by the allure and underlying
force of money-power emanating from those beneﬁtting from historically
unparalleled rises in their fortunes.
The locational choices of the extremely wealthy are one of a series of
selections relating to the maximization of opportunity and security, for
themselves and for their capital. Yet, as we argue here, a more subtle
series of accommodating strategies are put in place by policy and cor-
porate elites, architects, designers and personal and ﬁnancial services
professionals that operate as a supporting infrastructure that subcon-
sciously aligns with the needs of capital and those who hold it. The
central argument of this article is that the raw money-power of new
household, dynastic and individual formations of mega-wealth thereby
shapes the politics, built environment and social life of cities such as
London and colonizes the mentalities of those who beneﬁt from it. We
ﬁnd a correspondence then between these increases in wealth and the
capacity of its bearers to exert agency over the city’s look and feel
while diverting those political agendas required to sustain the social
and municipal elements of the city (Atkinson et al., 2016) We outline
the geography and levels of such wealth in the city, consider some of the
mechanisms by which such power is exerted and, ﬁnally, proﬁle the kinds
of changes to London that have emerged as it moves more closely to
being a plutocratic city.
Elites and Urban Life
Epochalist conceptualizations are widespread within sociology (Savage,
2009), and it may be useful to avoid viewing the rise of this new global
wealth-elite as, in some way or other, emblematic of the emergence of
some ‘new’ social formation; there are, to be sure, both continuities and
changes in the production and formation of these groups. As Savage
(2014b) has recently pointed out, within contemporary debates it is
already possible to identify an implicit ‘soft’ epochal language that
draws links between diﬀerent periods of capitalist development, the ana-
lysis of social class and processes of urban change. So, within such frame-
works, if the period of industrialization, from the late 18th century
onwards, marked the emergence of the manual working classes, then
the emergence of ‘Fordist’ forms of capitalist production, coupled with
the expansion of an ever more bureaucratic state, saw the growth of the
salaried middle classes alongside this proletariat. Both of these periods
were accompanied by attempts to make sense, not just of these distinctive
class formations, but also of their implications for the urban form
(Saunders, 1981). So earlier thinking on cities and modernity gave rise
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to the classical sociological thinking of Marx and Weber and, to a lesser
extent, that of Durkheim, Simmel and To¨nnies – arguably part of the
same conceptual pantheon.
These commentators attempted to understand the growth of the indus-
trial working classes, accompanying forms of urbanization and its dis-
tinctive urban culture. Euro-American sociology from the mid-20th
century onwards, however, tended to foreground analyses of the profes-
sional and managerial classes, with analysts as diverse as Bourdieu,
Goldthorpe, Giddens, Lockwood, Riesman, and Wright Mills all identi-
ﬁed by Savage as representatives of an emergent form of ‘modern’ soci-
ology concerned to come to terms with the socio-cultural signiﬁcance of
the middle classes. Concerns with suburbanization processes, the aesthe-
ticization of speciﬁc forms of housing, cultures of home ownership, issues
of globalization and belonging, gentriﬁcation and a gamut of other
‘urban’ topics can be viewed here as spatial concerns concomitant with
this analytic focus on middle-class formation and urban social
reproduction.
Analyses that almost entirely focus upon the working and middle-
classes have been slow to shift course. Indeed, only until very recently
those at the very top of the class structure have been something of a
minority interest amongst both sociologists (Sayer, 2014) and geog-
raphers (Beaverstock et al., 2004; Hay and Muller, 2012). However,
Savage (2014a, 2014b) suggests that this is now changing fundamentally.
Yet, even as it does, perhaps we must be careful not to deﬁne emerging
conjunctures – neoliberalism and ﬁnancialization processes with con-
comitant global wealth-elite inﬂuencing restructurings of urban space
(Andreotti et al., 2015) – simply as a new epoch. Rather, what we are
seeing in London is the result of policy-generated, long-running and
growing wealth inequalities made possible by deregulation and permis-
sive capital accumulation regimes. At the same time, the impact of
extending global wealth-elites, or what Fernandez et al. (2016) refer to
as ‘transnational wealth elites’, for the built environment and the socio-
economic makeup of London, is profound and also likely to be long
lasting. What is needed then is an analysis able to capture these two
realities – the longue dure´e of established money power and the more
recent ‘event’ of global elite-wealth incursion.
Global wealth-elites are undeniably contributing to fundamental
changes in the contemporary urban fabric. As we noted at the outset,
in the past few years London’s skyline, ambiance and economy have all
changed in profound ways. Whilst the post-Piketty (2014) research
agenda certainly foregrounds the emergence of new global wealth ‘safe
deposit box’ real estate purchases (Fernandez et al., 2016), at the same
time, in the UK context at least, it is also important to note the persist-
ence of long-established land-based wealth holdings by the Crown, the
English aristocracy, Oxbridge colleges, major charities, and national and
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local government bodies and agencies: traditional sources of wealth that
sit alongside – and increasingly interact with – the new global wealth
elites and their expanding super-prime property portfolios.
The freehold of much of London’s super-prime locations continues to
be controlled by ducal estates – Bedford, Cadogan and Grosvenor – that
still resonate with the names of the best appointed squares, streets and
crescents in Bloomsbury, Belgravia and Mayfair. The Duke of
Westminster’s estate has only recently been displaced as the wealthiest
owner of UK landholdings by Asian investors who have had to make do
with super-prime redevelopment opportunities such as Battersea Power
Station (owned by Malaysian investors) and One Nine Elms (by
Chinese). Foreign sovereign wealth funds have also taken an increasing
stake in London’s prime real estate, especially those based in the Arab
Gulf. Qatar owns 95 per cent of The Shard, and a large share of Canary
Wharf, and freeholds on Chelsea Barracks, the Olympic Village, the
American Embassy and much of Sloane Street, Camden Market, as
well as the jewel in the cognitive geography of the newly arrived wealthy –
Harrods. But despite the encroachment of such foreign ‘buy to leave’
investment, the Forestry Commission, the Corporation of London, the
Ministry of Defence and the National Trust still remain London’s top
landowners. Trinity College, Cambridge owns the O2 Arena while
Peterhouse includes the prestigious Piccadilly luxury apartment complex
The Albany in its investment portfolio.4 Therefore, as Yates and Murray
(2013) point out, it is all of London’s landowners – and the relationships
between them – that shape and reshape the city. For the moment it is
entirely understandable that we should focus on the impact of the mas-
sive incursion of capital from overseas on the restructuring of the city,
but it is the manner in which this capital interacts with, and is mediated
by, established and traditional forms of wealth and socio-political power
that is generative of the ways in which London as a city has changed and
will likely change in the next decade and more.5
While the resilience of ancient money-power remains important and
relevant to London’s history, there is no doubt that the raw money-
power of new household, dynastic and individual formations of mega-
wealth is impacting profoundly on the politics, built environment and
social life of London today. There is also a close correspondence between
increases in wealth and the capacity of its holders to exert agency over
city life and cultures (Shaxson and Christensen, 2013). These relation-
ships have come under increasing scrutiny amidst revelations that global
political elites were involved in anonymous oﬀshore investment funds, as
revealed in the so-called Panama Papers.6 Further, these revelations
oﬀered a growing sense of the direct corruption or corrupting inﬂuence
of money on London’s economy, particularly through investments in real
estate. Thus anonymous purchases by funds invested in by the global
elite and by international criminal and law-evading actors further
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emphasized the sense that London was being purchased by and on behalf
of a politically and legally immune plutocracy.
The synergy between wealth and politics goes well beyond traditional
growth-machine or regime type explanations more familiar to urban
economies in the US, precisely because national government, the City
of London, the Mayor of London and wealthy inner London boroughs
perform much more as a chamber orchestra in terms of harmonizing the
conditions for an optimal accumulation regime. As Raco argues in his
forensic analysis of the privatization of urban development in contem-
porary London:
Under regulatory capitalism, hybrid relationships emerge between
states and powerful corporations, to the point that the distinctions
between providers and policymakers become increasingly blurred.
The implications for decision-making, policy eﬀectiveness and
accountability are potentially enormous as private interests
become involved in co-producing all aspects of urban projects.
(Raco, 2012: 453)
Exemplary in this regard was a proposal by the Labour Opposition and
the Deputy Prime Minister and the then leader of the Liberal Democrats
to introduce a so-called ‘Mansion Tax’ (a higher rate property tax on
residences worth £2 million or more). In a report by the Director of
Research at Savills (one of the leading super-prime estate agencies in
the UK) for the Conservative-supporting think tank the Centre for
Policy Studies, the report’s author argued that a Mansion Tax would
negatively aﬀect ‘households who have bought property worth more than
£5 million in the past 10 years in the borough of Westminster [and who
have] contribute[d] £2.3 billion a year to the UK economy based on their
household expenditure alone’ (Cook, 2015: 6).
A mansion tax would also have an adverse impact on ‘[t]he wider UK
business interests of ultra-high net worth individuals who live full- or
part-time in the UK, and [t]he attraction of London to employees in high
value industries such as the ﬁnancial and business services sector, and the
growing tech sector’. But crucially the report’s author warned that a
mansion tax could also threaten ‘[t]he prime London development indus-
try’, a ‘prime development pipeline’ which ‘Savills forecast . . .will be
worth £44 billion’ over the next ﬁve years (Cook, 2015: 6).
As Fernandez et al. (2016: 2448) note:
The stable political environment and the instability at home make
foreign real estate investment into an insurance policy for many of
the non-OECD based plutocrats. Countries that are characterized
by low transaction costs for real estate investments (i.e., registration
fees, legal fees, administrative fees) and high levels of property
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rights, of which the UK and the US are prime examples, attract
larger foreign real estate investment streams.
In the case of London, ‘stability’ is reﬂected in an establishment chorus
against property-based wealth taxes that range from inﬂuential think-
tanks to the newspaper columns of ﬁnancial journalists and economic
commentators and prominent politicians such as the former Mayor of
London, Boris Johnson, who described the idea of a mansion tax as an
attempt by the Labour Party to ‘mug’ the people of London with a
‘vindictive’ tax.7
Wealth-Power
The concentration of money-power has, alongside longer running neo-
liberal modes of governance at national and borough levels, impacted
heavily on those in most need of state funding and resource, more so at
a time of ﬁscal austerity. In this context we can see how city success, so
often judged by measures of GDP and economic growth, fails to capture
the grounded reality and fails to satisfy much human need in urban centres
(Atkinson et al., 2016; Engelen et al., 2014). Layered onto this sense
of social disconnection and invisibility run the machinations of a political
sorting machine that gives rising emphasis to the privileging of wealth
and its legitimation while paring back the resources allocated to the
least well-oﬀ, especially through the capping of public housing subsidies
and state beneﬁts (Atkinson et al., 2016; Dorling, 2014; O’Hara, 2014).
The idea that city ‘success’ can be measured in terms of equal access to
essential resources has withered as a guiding ideal within political life.
UK central government appears to see its function increasingly as that of
an auctioneer presiding over the discounted sale of state assets, including
swathes of the capital’s public land to foreign investors (Meek, 2014).
These preoccupations are less about the power of plutocrats to bend rules
or invade political life in a direct sense. Rather, we would argue, they
derive from a ‘butler class’ orientation (York, 2015)8 of central and local
government that deferentially seeks to guide and service the locational
infrastructural needs of global wealth elites with their premium on new
build, private access, security and prestige super-prime addresses.
These concerns extend earlier commentaries on the roots of the world
ﬁnancial crisis that were located in the ‘cognitive capture’ (Freeland,
2012) of political life by the perceived needs and lobbying of ﬁnancial
elites and institutions.9 In this sense perhaps there has been a gentriﬁca-
tion of urban statecraft strategies which have moved from focusing on
the needs of footloose, creative and aﬄuent groups (Florida, 2008) to the
housing, cultural and security needs of global plutocrats who were
deemed to have ‘saved’ London and its housing market during the
early phases of the ﬁnancial crisis (Shaxson, 2013). This latent bias
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towards the wealthy emerges in planning diktats (Webber and Burrows,
2015), welfare changes and housing plans as the city acts to eﬀectively
divest itself of what is seen as redundant human capital (Glucksberg,
2016), now marked by the signiﬁcant displacement of welfare recipients
(Fenton et al., 2013) and, symbolically, through the demolition of public
housing estates in favour of ‘mixed-use’ sites (Watt, 2013).
Despite the wealth and pedigree of many members of the current
British government, the real wealth and power of global capital is felt
as a loss of control over the locational choices of the wealthy and the
sense of their necessity to a vital urban economy. The real anxiety here is
often expressed as a concern that rival plutocratic cities, such as those of
the Gulf States, Switzerland, New York, Hong Kong and Singapore,
(York, 2015), might win-out. The former Conservative Mayor of
London and leading ‘Brexiteer’, Boris Johnson, has been a notable cheer-
leader for the super-rich in this regard; writing in his Daily Telegraph
column, Johnson claimed that:
the top 0.1 per cent – about 29,000 people – pay an amazing 14.1 per
cent of all taxes . . . [so] . . . stop any bashing or moaning or preaching
or bitching and simply give thanks for the prodigious sums of money
that they are contributing to the tax revenues of this country, and
that enable us to look after our sick and our elderly and to build
roads, railways and schools. Indeed, it is possible . . . that they might
contribute even more if we cut their rates of tax; but it is time we
recognised the heroic contribution they already make. In fact, we
should stop publishing rich lists in favour of an annual list of the top
100 Tax Heroes, with automatic knighthoods for the top 10.
(Johnson, 2013)
These conditions and coalitions form a tight nexus of interests that
guides the psycho-political frames and tropes by which the potential tri-
umph of the core industry sector, high ﬁnance, may be further secured in
its global pre-eminence (Engelen et al., 2011). Here the interests of
ﬁnance and the super-rich are viewed as being identical to those of
good economic growth and economic prudence.
Beyond the ‘Dual City’?
The very considerable gap between the highest and lowest income groups
in London masks a much more complex underlying reality. The ‘dual
city’ – once identiﬁed by Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) – is increasingly
giving way, in global cities such as London, to what we might describe as
a ‘scalene’ city, characterized by an unequal triadic formation compris-
ing: (a) plutocrats (several thousand ultra-HNWIs) and perhaps almost
one hundred billionaires) supported by a local urban establishment,
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gentry and ﬁnancial elite (several tens of thousands); (b) a majority of
more or less precarious white collar and manual service class workers on
‘sub-mortgagable’ incomes; and (c) a retired, unemployed and under-
employed population in private rented or social housing living on bare
subsistence incomes numbering several million.10
Attempts to produce an inventory of urban money power, even in
relatively ‘open’ economies such as the United Kingdom’s, are fraught
with diﬃculties relating to the peculiarities of English property law,
because only land that has been bought and sold needs to be registered,
whereas land that has been passed from generation to generation does
not appear on the Land Registry (some 30% of all land in England and
Wales). However, in Central London, as much as 85 per cent of ‘prime’
properties (valued at £5 million or more) were acquired by overseas
buyers in 2012–13 according to estate agents LPP, while nearly all
sales of properties worth over £10 million went to foreign buyers.11 As
the Panama Papers revealed, those investors who wish to avoid UK tax
liabilities and external scrutiny often favour overseas-based shell compa-
nies that shield the identity of owners (Platt, 2015). Indeed ultra-HNWIs
will often go to extraordinary lengths to ensure that details of their global
property and business assets are kept as secret as possible, with teams of
lawyers, accountants and private banks permanently engaged to ensure
the maximum degree of security and conﬁdentiality (Shaxson, 2012;
Webber and Burrows, 2016). As a recent report by the Financial Times
noted:
London is often seen as a safe haven by wealthy investors when they
want to move money out of their home markets. Property in the
capital is a popular choice as a store of value because its ownership
structures are relatively opaque, making it harder for assets’ ultim-
ate ownership to be traced. Property owners who hold their homes
through a company structure need only to register the name of the
company with the Land Registry, not the name of the beneﬁcial
owner. Short of the outbreak of world peace, it is hard to see how
this trend will change.12
It is really only when these plutocratic assemblages seize the optimum
moment to spatially ﬁx their assets in a new development or planning
permission that we see the extent of the governance leverage behind
ultra-HNWI and corporate power. Major portfolio landowners, several
of them private equity companies, operate as both investment vehicles for
global wealth elites and facilitators of ultra-HNWI housing markets by
skewing development opportunities away from aﬀordable rent and
public use functions (such as schools, parks, and playgrounds) towards
luxury, high-end residential or commercial developments.
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The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, which contains some
of the most exclusive and expensive addresses in the world, had a waiting
list of 2677 social housing applicants in March 2014. Yet the local
authority planned to build no new social housing of its own, while agree-
ing to contribute a very modest £2.9 million in funding to a Peabody
Trust led housing project, which will provide 112 new homes (although
the number of social housing units is not speciﬁed).13 In 2013 the local
authority granted permission for 450 ‘mega basement’ excavations (com-
pared to just 46 in 2001). Although the council has sought to limit the
depth of any basement extension to just one storey and no more than 50
per cent of the existing garden area, it has been ‘aggressively opposed’ by
basement developers ‘every step of the way’ according to the cabinet
member for planning policy.14 This brief example indicates the structural
bias of juridical and political governance regimes in favour of the accu-
mulation strategies of very wealthy homeowners, while the homeless and
those in housing need are disenfranchised from the right to the city
through the lack of social housing provision, and unaﬀordable private
sector rents leading to what even ex-Mayor Boris Johnson has referred to
as ‘Kosovo-style social cleansing’ of those households for whom no
properties are available within the central government imposed housing
beneﬁt threshold.15
Who Are the Rich?
There has been something comfortable and relatively precise about the
identiﬁcation of a social group based around threshold measures of
income, wealth and other forms of asset. Measures of wealth such as
the notion of a HNWI used by the ﬁnancial services industry, while
possessing some degree of precision cannot easily be translated into pos-
itions within traditional schemas of social class or even self-aware status
groups. The diﬃculty with such consumption-based elite models is that
they fail to make a distinction between the outward manifestation of
global power (money or asset wealth) and the command power of an
emerging stateless money-power elite that continues to exercise polit-
ical power either directly or through proxies – principal-agents (Davies,
2016) – that enjoy privileged and continuous access to key decision-
makers at every scale of government.
The chair of the investment committee at Vestra Wealth explained that
UK taxes on foreign residents were still fairly light relative to other jur-
isdictions. According to Jenny Tozer, ‘During the ﬁnancial crisis France,
Italy and Spain ramped up taxes on foreigners who own property, which
has only increased the appeal of the UK’.16 Under the then Chancellor
George Osborne, reductions in corporation tax, and the higher rate of
income tax as well as the UK’s ‘opt out’ of the new EU ﬁnancial trans-
actions tax cemented London’s reputation as a highly wealth friendly
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environment which has attracted a substantial expatriate community
(York, 2015). Similarly the changes to inheritance tax now further
favour wealthy estates and can be seen as added evidence of a revanchist
politics that targets unworthy state recipients of support, while oﬀering
assistance and favours to the already wealthy. However, since only 18 per
cent of HNWIs believe that local taxation conditions and the local pol-
itical situation would negatively aﬀect their ability to generate wealth in
the next ﬁve years, and 70 per cent of European HNWIs believed that
their wealth would increase, it seems unlikely that London’s resident
super-rich are signiﬁcantly anxious about an imminent democratization
of their asset wealth (Knight Frank, 2014).
We can identify a number of deﬁning characteristics of the new urban
form, culture and politics that has emerged under the control and indirect
inﬂuence of the very wealthy. These underline the importance of under-
standing money-power as a major form of latent planning and inﬂuence
over the decision-making and resource allocations that occur in the cities
in which such power is clustered. In short, there is a non-random geog-
raphy of the super-rich in cities like London in which the key ingredients
of open and centralized ﬁnancial service sectors, transparent and low
tariﬀ tax regimes, a ﬁxed supply of positional property assets and the
presence of a globally positioned cultural circuit drive the locational
searches of the ﬁrst and second home purchases of the u¨ber-wealthy
(Burrows et al., 2017).
A particular feature of contemporary wealth formations is their almost
free-ﬂoating position above the wider social mass and physical fabric of
the city (Graham, 2016) and which has displaced the codes and, in some
cases, physical position of a more patrician, aristocratic and monied elite
which oﬀered a more reciprocal, engaged and connected form of patron-
age (Webber and Burrows, 2016). The kind of business elite exit from civic
life identiﬁed by Lasch (1995) began to mark a new kind of relationship
between an increasingly wealthy fraction of a nouveau riche class who had
been fattened under neoliberalism and the accrual of gigantic rewards for
work in ﬁnance, banking, insurance and real estate. Whether or not a class
as such, this group began to harvest windfall gains within a series of global
theatres of increasingly interconnected urban command centres and
national economies in which privatizations, newly commodiﬁed markets
(such as Russia and Mexico) and political elites, captured by the logic of
neoliberalism, thrived. But the increasing potential for a kind of sub or
latent political power, manifest for example through newspaper owner-
ship, political party backing or lobbying for crucial deregulations and
lowering tariﬀs, began to work back upon mainstream political life to
create the impression that it was the interests of this group that needed
to be courted in order for wider national economic success to be granted.
Thus national political parties in Britain, from the mid-1980s onwards,
tended to espouse the need for deregulation, privatization, and reducing
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the tax burdens of the wealthy, often justiﬁed because of claims that this
would not only beneﬁt the wealthy – whether they actually believed so or
not – but would begin to lift all boats in a rising economic tide. Yet as
Piketty (2014) and Harvey (2010) have argued, this is not what happened;
rather, modest gains by the middle classes were utterly outstripped by a
rapidly expanding and increasingly wealthy group under these political
regimes.
The kind of city that emerges under these conditions is, as we have
argued elsewhere (Atkinson et al., 2016), a kind of ‘minimum city’ in
which the bargain struck with private wealth has allowed private capital
to become the pre-eminent organizing principle of urban life while low-
income and middle-class households ﬁnd themselves unsupported or
dislocated. The loss of public housing, demolition of housing estates,
subsidy arrangements for ‘aﬀordable’ housing to high income earners
and welfare retrenchment are characteristic not only of an emergency
austerity mode following the ﬁnancial crash, but a deeper response by
the political elite to maintain the needs of the rich – chaperoning the
wealthy in order to insure the wider city against losses or leaks by capital
and wealthy groups to other cities globally vying for their attention.
For the middle-classes the emerging story is of a kind of victimization
from increasingly ﬁnancialized forms of ‘gentriﬁed gentriﬁcation’. This
has produced a re-scaling of class changes in local neighbourhoods so
that rather than the middle-classes displacing the working-classes it is
often now the super-rich who are set against the local, long established,
patrician elites in areas like Chelsea, Kensington, Highgate and so on,
furious at their displacement and the symbolic loss of the city to money
and foreigners (Webber and Burrows, 2016). The result has been a mix of
emotions in which confusion, alienation, post-colonial sentiment and
more direct forms of economic displacement have re-shaped the places
that were, until recently, the core residential territories of London’s
established elites.
From Market-Oriented to Socially Just Cities for All?
What characterizes the neoliberal city, as Williams and colleagues
(Engelen et al., 2014) point out, is a change from locally accountable
and elected urban governance to ‘new organisational setups, ideally
public-private partnerships, and a strategised approach to city promo-
tion’ (see also Jessop, 2002). Whereas:
[o]ld municipalities were administrative spaces for providing social
housing, transport, education, rubbish collection, public space and
other directly useful service . . . [the] . . . [n]ew municipalities have,
over the last two decades, spent their resources rather diﬀerently,
on the construction of a discursive space of urban neo-mercantilism.
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This concept of ‘new mercantilism’ is useful in considering the nature of
these changes (Robinson, 1973). The central argument suggests that ‘the
global economy is made of a set of national economies and of private
actors having unequal economic, ﬁnancial and political power’ (Uzunidis
and Laperche, 2011). For Robinson, the ﬁction at the heart of laissez-
faire political economy was Adam Smith’s claim that free trade enriches
all through a growing division of labour and an international system of
unrestricted self-regulating markets. In this context international trade,
as in all economic relations, generates asymmetries of outcome:
Since the total market does not grow fast enough to make room for
all, each government feels it a worthy and commendable aim to
increase its own share in world activity for the beneﬁt of its own
people. This is the new mercantilism. (Robinson, 1973: 10)
In the 1960s, at the height of the Keynesian Welfare State, Robinson’s
insistence that ﬁnancial and political power gave private elites an unfair
advantage in the global division of wealth was not widely shared. The
collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 appeared to herald the
death of the ill-fated attempt to operate an international gold standard
pegged to the US dollar and the advent of a ﬂoating exchange rate mech-
anism. The ensuing deregulation of foreign exchange controls, balance
sheet deposit ratios, low to non-existent capital transfer and corporate
tax rates, and the scrapping of controls on the foreign ownership of UK
corporate assets in the 1980s, especially the City of London ‘big bang’
deregulations of the mid 1980s, ﬁrmly established London as the premier
‘Treasure Island’ of the international ﬁnancial system. As Hettne (1993:
212) argued:
The contemporary context of the mercantilist logic is no longer the
nation-state . . .but the international political economy, in which
‘the political’ refers to a transnational framework of economic
transactions; in brief, a world order. (emphasis in original)
This logic comes to roost in the daily life and governance of London in
which pro-wealth governmentalities operate to ensure the frictionless cap-
acity of disembodied wealth even as it recognizes that these permissions
beneﬁt its own compliant elite while forcing the subsistence and disloca-
tion of a large bulk of the wider urban population. As Robinson observed:
The free-traders used to mock at the old mercantilists for thinking
that a country could grow rich by amassing treasure. The new mer-
cantilists believe that it is not necessarily foolish to prefer to acquire
sterile money rather than useful goods or proﬁtable assets.
(Robinson, 1973: 13, emphasis added)
192 Theory, Culture & Society 34(5–6)
The essence of this is that money and riches are signs of triumph in their
own right, and that the bearers of such wealth are signs of this victory of
the city over others. In an era where the return to capital is greater than
economic growth and wages (Piketty’s ‘r> g’) it makes sense for city
managers and the political establishment to acquire ‘sterile money’
(super-prime real estate and other investment and the use of ﬁnancial
services) as the mainstay of a contemporary mercantilist economic
growth strategy. Where these highly valued goods exist in ﬁnite supply
(be it gold, silver, ﬁne art or real estate), those who control it also control
the means of wealth generation. Increasingly high value economic trans-
actions and the legal and political environment in which they take place
are dominated by a very small group of ultra-HNWIs whose need for
privacy and discretion in the management and scrutiny of their ﬁnancial
assets, high level personal family and property protection, tolerant for-
eign domicile regimes, high quality/high status private education, and the
avoidance of tax liabilities determines the territorial location of their
investments.
All of this suggests that the rise of a plutocratic city – a site in which
money drives, cajoles and lures political choices and the built environ-
ment and culture of the city – comes on the back of longer-term invest-
ments, ideological apparatuses and concerted political eﬀorts. These
seek to generate the conditions under which the rules of international
capital – money ﬂowing to where the returns are greatest – privilege the
national centres of competing cities in a new global hierarchy.
Signiﬁcant in this regard was Chancellor of the Exchequer George
Osborne’s series of ‘missions’ following the referendum defeat in July
2016 in order to reassure investors in New York, Singapore and China
that despite leaving the European Union, the United Kingdom – and
especially the City of London and its ﬁnancial services industry – was
not ‘quitting the world’ and was more determined than ever to be the
premium location for global capital ﬂows and for the purchase of high
value assets.17
In all of this it seems especially important to understand how polit-
ical actors conﬂate city fortunes with the physical presence of the very
wealthy. To be open to capital ﬂows is also to be open to the prospect
of migration to the city by the wealthy themselves and to be seen to
oﬀer any kind of hostility to the wealthy is seen as running the risk of
deterring such investment (Short, 2016). This position has come under
increasing pressure as the traditional political heartlands of right of
centre parties have found themselves trying to balance a desire for
unchecked capital investment while increasingly being forced to
acknowledge that even their wealthier constituents are now increasingly
alienated by the kinds of symbolic changes, environmental disruption
and rising costs of living in what they see as ‘their’ territories (Webber
and Burrows, 2015).
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Conclusion
We have sought to chart the changes wrought by the global super-rich in
broad terms, characterizing this plutocratic city as more than a set of con-
nections and networks betweenwealth and a compliant or ‘bought’ political
class (though, no doubt, many would argue this point too). Politicians at all
scales of government have generally welcomed a highly mobile global elite
and defended their presence by insisting that ultra-HNWIs are few in
number and that their use of resources has a very modest impact on the
wider population. Global wealth elites are also cherished for bringing repu-
tational capital, high levels of spending and the injection of major invest-
ment into real estate and ﬁnancial vehicles in the city.
At the same time, these changes have generated an urbanism of two
speeds and directions – the super-charged rush of capital and bodies to the
luxury districts of the city, and a slower yet marked exodus of lower paid
workers andmarginal groups that are seen as an illegitimate burden on the
newly wealthy. These dichotomies also emerge from the longue dure´e of
capital accumulation and its sedimentation within the key centres of
global urban power, which only temporarily abated as a result of global
conﬂict and a relatively brief period of welfare Keynesianism during the
20th century in the UK andUSA. The return to rates of growth for capital
and unearned income closely resemble levels last seen in the early part of
the 20th century and, like that period, we appear to have seen similar
forms of symbolic, cultural, political and economic change alongside –
the spectacle of competitive and overt displays of architectural excess,
leisure playgrounds and closed circuits of consumption, discrete mobili-
ties, a move away from public engagement and the capture of a political
class in fear of losing investment to other global centres.
As Raco has argued, ‘despite decades of global ‘‘good governance’’
discourses and a broader emphasis by states on devolution and commu-
nity empowerment, the political realities of regulatory capitalism often
involve a systematic erosion in the power and legitimacy of democratic
systems’ (Raco, 2012: 453). This is particularly evident in the accommo-
dationist strategy that successive UK governments since the Thatcher era
have adopted in relation to foreign owned corporations and non-dom-
iciled ultra-HNWIs, and the aggressive defence of the City of London’s
self-regulating powers and its medieval system of local representation,
which uniquely retains the ‘non-resident business vote’. As Andreotti and
colleagues write:
a new elite, made of urban social groups within upper or upper-
middle classes, is taking advantage of the increasingly relevant
mobility tendencies to challenge existing national elites, push for
diﬀerent modernisation projects and promote their own ambitions
and interests. (Andreotti et al., 2015: 9)
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We are seeing then nothing less than an elite unbundling of the post-
war Keynesian compact which, however one-sided, linked the material
wealth of the national grande bourgeoisie and the upper reaches of the
professional and managerial class to the labour market and welfare
aspirations of the working and middle classes. The irresistible rise of
a global, cosmopolitan and super-wealthy elite and their strong dispos-
ition towards deregulated, capital-friendly entrepots such as the United
Kingdom, and especially its capital city, are the key drivers of the kind
of plutocratic city that emerges in which money inﬂuences politics,
media, the cityscape and economic choices of the elite. Cities like
London run the risk of alienating both the poor and middle-income
groups as money is courted to the detriment of broader programmes of
social investment and infrastructure. The future of these antagonisms
and the form of urban politics generated by them will be interesting to
monitor.18
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Notes
1. The figures in this regard are now stark. Oxfam (2017) has recently reported
that in 2010 some 388 individuals had accumulated the same amount of
wealth as the bottom 50 per cent of the global population; by 2012 it was
159, in 2014 it was 80, in 2015 it was 62, and in 2016 it was just 8.
2. See also the recent report in The Guardian on the strong metropolitan pref-
erences of the very wealthy in the UK (http://www.theguardian.com/money/
2015/nov/15/wealthy-homebuyers-prefer-to-live-in-cities; accessed 27
September 2016).
3. Whether these individuals constitute a social class is, of course, a moot point
(Savage et al., 2015), and one to which we hope our discussion here will make
a contribution.
4. James Fitzgerald, ‘Who Owns London?’, The Londonist, 24 August 2014.
(http://londonist.com/2014/08/who-owns-london.php; accessed 27
September 2016).
5. See, for example: http://www.academyofurbanism.org.uk/here-now-3-
london-term-stewardship-of-london/ (accessed 27 September 2016).
6. See: https://panamapapers.icij.org/ (accessed 27 September 2016).
7. Boris Johnson claims Labour is trying to ‘mug’ Londoners with ‘vindictive’
mansion tax. The Independent, 7 January 2015 (http://www.independent.co.
uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-claims-labour-is-trying-to-mug-lon-
doners-with-vindictive-mansion-tax-9962743.html; accessed 27 September
2016).
8. See also ‘‘‘Ushers and Butlers’’ . . . how fawning politicians welcomed world’s
rich’, The Guardian, 23 January 2016 (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/jan/23/london-fawning-politicians-welcome-rich; accessed 27
September 2016).
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9. This term, ‘cognitive capture’, emerged from a briefing note by one of the
major banks, but a key outcome of this has not only been to align the city
and its facilities to those of the rich but also to shift the mood, culture and
physical fabric of the city more broadly. Shaxson (2011) and Dorling (2014)
talk about similar processes in a more conspiratorial fashion, suggesting
City of London funding of right-wing pro-wealth think tanks
10. Although this model will be more complex as generational differences in
property ownership from earlier periods still retain some efficacy.
Households of quite modest means who, either by luck or judgement, pur-
chased a property decades ago in a neighbourhood that has subsequently
come ‘up’ will not fit so easily in to this schema.
11. Lee Boyce, ‘London for sale! 85% of homes in the capital’s centre sold to
overseas buyers as weak pound sees foreign interest soar’, This is Money
(http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/mortgageshome/article-2340858/85-
homes-Central-London-sold-overseas-buyers.html#ixzz3Sr39drkw;
accessed 27 September 2016).
12. ‘Financial Times, London and theworld’, 30 September 2014 (http://im.ft-static.
com/content/images/a7447886-4477-11e4-bce8-00144f eabdc0.pdf; accessed 27
September 2016).
13. Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea, Freedom of Information Request,
14 April 2014, REF: 2014–409 (https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/
housing_statistics_15#incoming-505442; accessed 27 September 2016).
14. ‘Kensington and Chelsea’s clampdown on ‘‘mega-basements’’ backed by
inspector’, Planning Resource, 3 December 2014 (http://www.planningre-
source.co.uk/article/1324995/kensington-chelseas-clampdown-mega-base-
ments-backed-inspector; accessed 27 September 2016).
15. ‘Boris Johnson opposes David Cameron over housing benefit cut’,
The Independent, 28 October 2010 (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/politics/boris-johnson-opposes-david-cameron-over-housing-benefit-cut-
2118975.html; accessed 27 September 2016).
16. Vanessa Houlder, ‘UK tax take on wealthy ‘‘non-doms’’ rises 6%’, Financial
Times, 3 February 2014 (https://www.ft.com/content/1fd89cde-8ce3-11e3-
ad57-00144feab7de; accessed 27 September 2016).
17. HM Treasury, ‘Chancellor kickstarts work on building stronger economic
and trade relationships with Britain’s closest international partners’, 11 July
2016 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-kickstarts-work-on-
building-stronger-economic-and-trade-relationships-with-britains-closest-
international-partners; accessed 27 September 2016).
18. This paper was drafted some time ago, but much of what we discuss here has
implications for coming to terms with the Grenfell Tower fire. Atkinson
(2017) has updated the analysis offered here to take account of this.
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